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Chapter 4.The characterization of remote warfare under 
international humanitarian law 
Anthony Cullen 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the qualification of remote warfare as a form of armed conflict 
under international humanitarian law. It does so first by considering how armed 
conflict is defined and how the concept has evolved since the drafting of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. It then focuses on three modes of attack that are commonly 
associated with remote warfare: the use of remotely piloted vehicles, cyber operations, 
and autonomous weapon systems. Bearing in mind the challenges that each of these 
present to the applicability of the law, it will be argued that the concept of armed 
conflict needs to be interpreted in terms consistent with the object and purpose of 
international humanitarian law, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
1. DEFINING ‘ARMED CONFLICT’ 
The most fundamental prerequisite for the applicability of international humanitarian 
law is the existence of armed conflict. Without armed conflict, this body of law is 
deprived of the material field for its application. Accordingly, the characterization of 
the situation as one of armed conflict is of pivotal importance for the protection 
provided by international humanitarian law. In this section, the concept of armed 
conflict will be analysed, providing the basis for the qualification of remote warfare 
under international humanitarian law. 
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The applicability of international humanitarian law is determined by the terms 
of Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common 
Article 2 states that the Conventions will apply to ‘all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them’. Common Article 3 
sets out the applicability of a ‘minimum’ of provisions ‘[i]n the case of armed conflict 
not of an international character’. Together, common Articles 2 and 3 define the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to situations of international and non-
international armed conflict. The use of the term ‘armed conflict’ in both provisions 
was significant. It was the first time that term had been used to define the applicability 
of a treaty. As noted by the ICRC Commentary on the first Geneva Convention: 
It fills the gap left in the earlier Conventions, and deprives the 
belligerents of the pretexts they might in theory invoke for evasion of 
their obligations. There is no longer any need for a formal declaration 
of war, or for recognition of the state of war, as preliminaries to the 
application of the Convention. The Convention becomes applicable as 
from the actual opening of hostilities. The existence of armed conflict 
between two or more Contracting Parties brings it automatically into 
operation. 
It remains to ascertain what is meant by ‘armed conflict’. The 
substitution of this much more general expression for the word ‘war’ 
was deliberate. One may argue almost endlessly about the legal 
definition of ‘war’. A State can always pretend, when it commits a 
hostile act against another State, that it is not making war, but merely 
engaging in a police action, or acting in legitimate self-defence. The 
expression ‘armed conflict’ makes such arguments less easy.1 
In this way, the use of ‘armed conflict’ in common Articles 2 and 3 avoided issues 
surrounding the legal characterization of ‘war’.2 The applicability of the law of war 
                                                          
1
 Jean S Pictet (ed), Commentary I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC 1952) 32. 
2
 Even so, it still ‘remains the case that some States deny the existence of armed conflicts, rendering 
dialogue difficult on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and the protection of those affected 
by it.’ International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law and the challenges of 
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was expanded. With subsequent developments in treaty law, and changes in the nature 
of armed conflict, the meaning associated with the term has continued to evolve. One 
of the most significant turning points in this context was the decision of the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case. In its Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber defined the concept of 
armed conflict as follows: 
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of 
such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities 
until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of 
internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.
3
 
This definition of armed conflict filled a lacuna that had previously existed in the law. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not include a definition of armed conflict. 
Although definitions were included in the additional protocols of 1977,
4
 these 
definitions referred to specific categories of armed conflict; they did not address the 
conditions required for the application of international humanitarian law more 
generally in situations of international or non-international armed conflict. The 
concept of armed conflict propounded by the ICTY thus embodied a very significant 
development of the law. Sonja Boelaert-Suominen commented on its significance as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contemporary armed conflicts, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
32IC/15/11, October 2015, 7. 
3
 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 
October 1995, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para 70. For discussion of the definition provided by the 
Tadić Appeals Chamber see: Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 115–58. 
4
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, 1977, Article 1(4); 
and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, 1977, Article 1. 
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The seemingly innocuous description by the Appeals Chamber of what 
constitutes an armed conflict was innovative in various respects. First, 
it covers a variety of hypotheses and caters explicitly for conflicts 
between non-state entities. Second, whilst it sets a low threshold for 
the application of humanitarian law in general, it is particularly 
important for its consequences in relation to internal armed conflicts. 
The definition of armed conflict suggested by the Appeals Chamber 
covers not only the classic examples of (a) an armed conflict between 
two or more states and (b) a civil war between a state on the one hand, 
and a non-state entity on the other. It clearly encompasses a third 
situation, (c) an armed conflict in which no government party is 
involved, because two or more non-state entities are fighting each 
other.
5
 
The Tadić definition, included in obiter and credited to the presiding judge Antonio 
Cassese,
6
 has become one of the most authoritative points of reference in the 
characterization of armed conflict under international humanitarian in law.
7
 In doing 
so, it has broadened the applicability of the Geneva Conventions beyond the 
conditions considered by the drafters of these treaties in 1949. Nevertheless, it 
preserves the distinction introduced by the Geneva Conventions between international 
armed conflict (under common Article 2) and non-international armed conflict (under 
common Article 3).
8
 The section that follows considers the relevance of the concept to 
the practice of remote warfare. 
                                                          
5
 Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, ‘The Yugoslav Tribunal and the Common Core of Humanitarian Law 
Applicable to All Armed Conflicts’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 619 at 632–3. 
According to Christopher Greenwood, 
The definitions of international and internal armed conflict are of considerable importance. 
Neither term is defined in the Geneva Conventions or other applicable agreements. Whereas 
there is an extensive literature on the definition of ‘war’ in international law, armed conflict 
has always been considered a purely factual notion and there have been few attempts to define 
or even describe it. 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘The Development of International Law by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 97 at 114. 
6
 Peter Rowe, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case’ (1996) 45 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 691 at 697. 
7
 See generally: Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 117–58. 
8
 As noted by Lindsay Moir, ‘[t]he characterization of an armed conflict as being either international or 
non-international in nature remains a vital exercise for determining the applicability of different rules 
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THE CHARACTERIZATION OF REMOTE WARFARE UNDER THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
As illustrated in the introductory chapter to this volume, remote warfare has existed 
from time immemorial. In terms of legal regulation, the challenge has been one of 
responding to changes in the actual conduct of armed conflict. This section focuses on 
changes arising from three new categories of weapons: remotely piloted vehicles 
(drones), cyber weapons; and autonomous weapon systems. In doing so, it will 
consider the impact of each for the characterization of armed conflict under 
international humanitarian law. 
Remotely Piloted Vehicles (Drones) 
The use of drones for the targeted killing of suspected terrorists has been a subject 
considerable debate among scholars of international law, in particular since the killing 
of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in November 2002.
9
 Feeding this debate has been 
discussions concerning the ethical, humanitarian and legal implications of US foreign 
policy.
10
 For scholars, activists and professionals in the field of international 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of IHL.’ Lindsay Moir, ‘The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict’ in Andrew Clapham, Paola 
Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 
2015) 391–414, 414. 
9
 Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi was killed by the CIA in Yemen using an unmanned Predator drone on 3 
November 2002. See Chris Downes, ‘“Targeted Killings” in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the 
Yemen Strike’ (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 277–94; A P V Rogers, Law on the 
Battlefield (Oxford University Press 2013) 50–1; Noam Lubell, ‘The War (?) against Al-Qaeda’ in 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 450. 
10
 See: Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law and Morality 
in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford University Press, 2012); Bradley Jay Strawser (ed), Killing by 
Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford University Press 2013); Dan Saxon, 
International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War (Brill, 2013); Sikander Ahmed 
Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-political Aspects 
(Routledge, 2014); James DeShaw Rae, Analyzing the Drone Debates: Targeted Killings, Remote 
Warfare, and Military Technology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Sarah Knuckey (ed), Drones and 
Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics (International Debate Education Association 2014); Steven 
Barela (ed), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs 
(Ashgate, 2015); Aleš Završnik, Drones and Unmanned Aerial Systems: Legal and Social Implications 
for Security and Surveillance (Springer International Publishing, 2015); Jammel Jaffer (ed), The Drone 
Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law (New Press, 2016); and Bart Custers (ed), The Future 
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humanitarian law, a significant part of the debate concerning the use of such weapons 
has centred on the context for their use and the characterization of this context as one 
of ‘armed conflict’. In the absence of the conditions described in Tadić, questions 
have been raised concerning the lawfulness of attacks undertaken remotely using such 
weapons and the applicability of international humanitarian law. The significance of 
characterizing the context as one of armed conflict was highlighted in the Study on 
Targeted Killings authored by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston: 
Outside the context of armed conflict, the use of drones for targeted 
killing is almost never likely to be legal. A targeted drone killing in a 
State’s own territory, over which the State has control, would be very 
unlikely to meet human rights law limitations on the use of lethal 
force.
11
 
The position adopted by the government of the United States has been a starting point 
for many discussions on the applicability of international humanitarian law to drone 
warfare. The position of the United States is that since 11 September 2001 it has been 
engaged in an armed conflict with ‘al-Qaida and associated forces’. Although 
references to a ‘war on terror’ were avoided under the Obama administration, there 
was continuity with the Bush administration in the policy adopted regarding the 
characterization of the campaign as one of armed conflict. A statement of this position 
was provided in 2012 by John Brennan, then a Legal Advisor to President Obama: 
As the President has said many times, we are at war with al-Qa’ida … 
Our ongoing armed conflict with al-Qa’ida stems from our right—
recognized under international law—to self defense. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal Perspectives (Information 
Technology and Law Series, Springer, 2016). 
11
 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted 
Killings, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010, para 85. For a discussion of the US position on 
this point, see: Max Brookman-Byrne, ‘Drone Use ‘Outside Areas of Active Hostilities’: An 
Examination of the Legal Paradigms Governing US Covert Remote Strikes’ (2017) 64 Netherlands 
International Law Review 3. 
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An area in which there is some disagreement is the geographic scope 
of the conflict. The United States does not view our authority to use 
military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ 
battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed 
conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United States takes the legal position 
that—in accordance with international law—we have the authority to 
take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a 
separate self-defense analysis each time. And as President Obama has 
stated on numerous occasions, we reserve the right to take unilateral 
action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the 
necessary actions themselves. 
Brennan’s statement, like others issued by representatives of the Obama 
administration,
12
 conflates the law of armed conflict with the right of self-defense. In 
terms of scope, the campaign is open-ended. Although Obama distanced himself from 
the idea of perpetual war, the duration of the campaign against al-Qa’ida and 
associated forces is one that is not limited by the timeframe of a US government 
administration. When asked during a Senate hearing in 2013 about the anticipated 
duration of the campaign, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low-Intensity Conflict, Michael Sheehan answered ‘at least 10 to 20 years’.13 
This appears to suggest no predetermined limit to the duration of the campaign. 
With regard to the geographic scope of the campaign, it is generally accepted 
that international humanitarian law applies to the theatre of hostilities, to places where 
prisoners of war are detained and to areas under the control of a party to the conflict. 
However, as Brennan mentioned in his statement, the United States does not view its 
campaign as being confined to ‘hot’ battlefields like the ones in Afghanistan. The 
                                                          
12
 For collection of relevant US legal and policy documents (including John Brennan's statement), see: 
Jammel Jaffer (ed), The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law (New Press, 2016). 
13
 See: Glenn Greenwald, ‘Washington gets explicit: its “war on terror” is permanent’, The Guardian, 
17 May 2013, accessed 4 June 2017 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/17/endless-war-on-terror-obama.  See also: 
Spencer Ackerman, ‘Pentagon Spec Ops Chief Sees ‘10 to 20’ More Years of War Against al-Qaida’, 
Wired, 16 May 2013, accessed 4 June 2017 at https://www.wired.com/2013/05/decades-of-war/ 
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campaign crosses many national boundaries: Besides Afghanistan, attacks have been 
reported in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq, Mali and Libya. 
When attacks using drones are undertaken in the context of a pre-existing local 
armed conflict—whether international or non-international in nature—it is 
undoubtable that international humanitarian law would apply to these operations. The 
situation is less clear where there is no pre-existing armed conflict and no consent for 
the use of UAVs against suspects terrorists from the authorities of the state in which 
the attack takes place. According to the US position, the ‘armed conflict’ is one that is 
global; it is one that follows wherever the use of lethal force is authorized by the US 
government, the exercise of which is justified on a continuing basis of self-defense. 
In addition to targeting ‘al-Qa’ida and its associated forces’, the approach 
adopted by the United States has also been extended to the Islamic State (ISIS). In 
remarks made at the US-ASEAN Press Conference on 16 February 2016, President 
Obama stated: ‘I have been clear from the outset that we will go after ISIS wherever it 
appears, the same way that we went after al Qaeda wherever they appeared.’14 This 
position on the extraterritorial use of lethal force has attracted expressions of concern 
from various quarters.
15
 When questioned by the chair of the UK Parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, the UK Secretary for Defence, Michael Fallon, 
acknowledged differences between the position of the United States and that of the 
                                                          
14
 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama at U.S.-ASEAN Press 
Conference, February 16, 2016, accessed 4 June 2017 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/16/remarks-president-obama-us-asean-press-conference. 
15
 For example, see: Amnesty International, ‘Doctrine of pervasive ‘war’ continues to undermine 
human rights: A reflection on the ninth anniversary of the AUMF’, AI Index: AMR 51/085/2010, 15 
September 2010, 2; Human Rights Watch, Letter to President Obama: Targeted Killings by the US 
Government, 16 December 2011, accessed 4 June 2017 at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/16/letter-president-obama-targeted-killings-us-government; UN 
News Centre, ‘UN independent expert voices concerns over the practice of targeted killings’, 2 June 
2010, accessed 4 June 2017 at goo.gl/yysKob; or UN News Centre, ‘UN human rights expert questions 
targeted killings and use of lethal force’, 20 October 2011, accessed 4 June 2017 at goo.gl/a5K3wC. 
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United Kingdom. With regard to the characterization of the campaign as a non-
international armed conflict, Fallon stated: 
It is for the Americans to defend or describe their own definition. We 
would consider on a case-by-case basis, where there is an armed 
conflict between government authorities and various organised armed 
groups, and we would look at various factors case-by-case … such as 
the duration or intensity of the fighting.
16
 
Recognizing differences in the legal positions of the United States and United 
Kingdom on the extraterritorial use of lethal force, the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Human Rights emphasized the urgent need for greater clarity from the government 
of the United Kingdom: 
The UK’s support for this use of lethal force abroad by the US 
demonstrates the urgent need for the Government to clarify its 
understanding of the legal basis for the UK’s policy. The US policy, in 
short, is that it is in a global armed conflict with ISIL/Da’esh, as it has 
been since 9/11 with al-Qaida, which entitles it to use lethal force 
against it ‘wherever they appear.’ On this view, the Law of War 
applies to any such use of force against ISIL/Da’esh, wherever they 
may be. This is not, however, the position of the UK Government. As 
the Defence Secretary made clear in his evidence to us, the 
Government considers itself to be in armed conflict with ISIL/Da’esh 
only in Iraq and Syria.
17
 
It is noteworthy in this context that the position adopted by the United States on 
characterization of its campaign departs from prevailing views of what armed conflict 
consists of. The International Committee of the Red Cross, an organization regarded 
as the ‘guardian of international humanitarian law’, has stated that it ‘does not share 
the view that a conflict of global dimensions is or has been taking place’.18 Consistent 
                                                          
16
 UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, Oral evidence: The UK Government’s policy on 
the use of drones for targeted killing, HC 574, Wednesday, 16 December 2015, 3. 
17
 UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s policy on the use of drones 
for targeted killing: Second Report of Session 2015–16, HC 574, HL Paper 141, 10 May 2016, 58. 
18
 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 31st 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 31IC/11/5.1.2, October 2011, 10. See 
also: Amnesty International, ‘Doctrine of pervasive ‘war’ continues to undermine human rights: A 
reflection on the ninth anniversary of the AUMF’, AI Index: AMR 51/085/2010, 15 September 2010, 2. 
(‘[T]here is no place in international humanitarian and human rights law for a legal category of global 
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with the approach developed in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the position of the 
ICRC is that the applicability of international humanitarian law is triggered by 
‘violence [reaching] the threshold of armed conflict, whether international or non-
international’. 19  Accordingly, the characterization of a situation as one of armed 
conflict is to be determined on a case-by-case basis: 
[E]ach situation of organized armed violence must be examined in the 
specific context in which it takes place and must be legally qualified as 
armed conflict, or not, based on the factual circumstances. The law of 
war was tailored for situations of armed conflict, both from a practical 
and a legal standpoint. One should always remember that IHL rules on 
what constitutes the lawful taking of life or on detention in 
international armed conflicts, for example, allow for more flexibility 
than the rules applicable in non-armed conflicts governed by other 
bodies of law, such as human rights law. In other words, it is both 
dangerous and unnecessary, in practical terms, to apply IHL to 
situations that do not amount to war.
20
 
For Professor Christine Gray, ‘[i]t is the substantive law that is crucial, and it is here 
that the USA’s position is weakest’. 21  Although armed conflict has evolved 
considerably since the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the concept still 
possesses temporal and geographic scope. In failing to take this into account, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and pervasive but non-international armed conflict, suspending the ordinary rule of law and human 
rights whenever and wherever an individual state deems necessary, as distinct from a series of specific 
geographic zones of international or non-international armed conflict.’) For a contrary view, see: Noam 
Lubell, ‘Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military Operations against Armed Groups’ (2017) 93 
International Law Studies 215 at 245. 
19
 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 30th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 30IC/07/8.4,October 2007, 7. 
20
 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, 30th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 30IC/07/8.4,October 2007, 8. On the 
applicability of international humanitarian law to drones, see the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs, 
Philip Alston, Ben Emmerson and Christof Heynes: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Study on Targeted Killings, UN Doc 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, UN Doc 
A/68/389, 18 September 2013; Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Christof Heyns, UN Doc A/68/382, 13 September 2013; Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
Ben Emmerson, UN Doc A/HRC/25/59, 11 March 2014. 
21
 Christine Gray, ‘Targeted Killings: Recent US Attempts to Create a Legal Framework’ (2013) 66 
Current Legal Problems 75–106, 106. 
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position adopted by the United States blurs the distinction between peace and war. As 
noted by Christof Heyns, ‘[t]he danger is one of a global war without borders’.22 It 
also ‘raises the question why other States should not engage in the same practices’.23 
Ultimately, as noted by the Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public 
International Law, to avoid: 
setting precedents that could be used by other states or entities in the 
fairly near future, it is vital that the existing international legal 
framework for the deployment of such a weapons system be 
consistently and strictly complied with. States need to be as clear as 
possible about the legal bases invoked when deploying armed drones.
24
 
For the use of drones to be lawful as a form of remote warfare, the context must be 
one of armed conflict. The absence of clarity concerning the characterization of 
situations as such is detrimental not only to applicable legal regimes but also for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The concern has also been raised that 
‘the use of armed drones for killings in remote places with little or no risk to one’s 
own forces raises the issue of lowering the threshold to the point of trivialising such 
interventions and of accountability for the actual outcome of each strike’. 25 
Considering the continued growth in the deployment of armed drones, and the 
frequently transnational nature of their use, it is arguable that more attention would be 
useful at an international level to strengthen compliance with the law. Christof Heyns, 
Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta contend that: 
                                                          
22
 UN News Centre, ‘UN human rights expert questions targeted killings and use of lethal force’, 20 
October 2011, accessed 4 June 2017 at goo.gl/a5K3wC. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV), Advisory Report on Armed 
Drones, Advisory Report No. 23, The Hague, July 2013, 27–8. 
25
 Arcadio Díaz Tejera, ‘Drones and targeted killings: the need to uphold human rights and 
international law’, a report issued to Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 13731, 16 March 2015, para 61. 
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There is an urgent need for the international community to gain greater 
consensus on the interpretation of the constraints that international law 
in all its manifestations places on the use of drones. This is important 
not only because of the implications for those who currently find 
themselves on the receiving end of drones, but in order to keep a viable 
and strong system of international security intact. A central component 
of such a security system is the rule of law. Drones should follow the 
law, not the other way around.
26
 
As the context for the use of armed drones determines the applicability of 
international humanitarian law, so it is with other forms of remote warfare. The 
section that follows examines cyber operations and explores issues surrounding the 
characterization of such as a form of armed conflict. 
Cyber Operations 
In its 2015 report International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary 
armed conflicts, the International Committee of the Red Cross defined ‘cyber warfare’ 
as ‘operations against a computer or a computer system through a data stream, when 
used as means and methods of warfare in the context of an armed conflict, as defined 
under IHL’.27 According to the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare: ‘A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage 
or destruction to objects.’ 28  Although consensus has yet to emerge on the 
                                                          
26
 Written evidence from Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson 
Chengeta (DRO0024), ‘The Right to Life and the International Law Framework Regulating the Use of 
Armed Drones in Armed Conflict or Counter-Terrorism Operations’, 10 December 2015, 46. See: 
Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Thompson Chengeta, ‘The right to life 
and the international law framework regulating the use of armed drones’ (2016) 65 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 791 at 826. See also: Summary of the Human Rights Council interactive 
panel discussion of experts on the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in compliance with 
international law: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
UN Doc A/HRC/28/38, 15 December 2014, para 56. 
27
 ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, Doc. 
32IC/15/11, Geneva, October 2015, 39. 
28
 Michael N Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 106. See also Michael N Schmitt, ‘Classification in Future 
Conflict’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 455–77, 461 (‘Intuitively, it seems that the determinative criterion must be 
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characterization of cyber warfare, as a weapon employed in the context of armed 
conflict the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations is 
beyond doubt. According to Gary Solis: 
If there is a circumstance in armed conflict that was unforeseen (and 
unforeseeable) by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is cyber warfare. 
Still, cyber warfare can be dealt with using traditional law of war tools, 
recognizing that today’s jus ad bellum cyber war questions can 
instantly ripen into jus in bello issues. Cyber attacks are not per se 
LOAC violations. They are another strategy or tactic of warfare … 
When considering their effect or use, they may be thought of as being 
similar to kinetic weapons.
29
 
As noted by William Boothby, ‘[t]he law of armed conflict contains no ad hoc rules 
that … permit, prohibit, or restrict the lawful circumstances of use of cyber weapons 
as such’.30 However, it is clear that cyber weapons are to be governed by the same 
rules that regulate the use of weapons more generally under international 
humanitarian law. Principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity 
would apply to attacks undertaken by way of cyber operations. As a form of remote 
warfare, cyber operations must comply with the relevant rules of international 
humanitarian law, including prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks or attacks likely to 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The issue of ensuring compliance 
with such rules is, however, thwarted by the secretive nature of cyber operations, the 
lack of transparency under which attacks are undertaken and the absence of a treaty 
specifically concerned with the regulation of cyberwarfare. Solis comments that: 
Defining many aspects of cyber warfare is problematic because there is 
no multinational treaty directly dealing with cyber warfare. That is 
because, so far, many aspects of cyber war are not agreed upon. The 
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law of war, as well as customary international law, lacks cyber-specific 
norms, and state practice interpreting applicable norms is slow to 
evolve.
31
 
As a form of remote warfare, there are many issues which impact on the 
characterization of cyber operations as armed conflict under international 
humanitarian law. Questions concerning the attribution of attacks, the nature of 
operations required for the threshold of cyber warfare, and the classification of armed 
conflicts initiated in this way, all pose challenges to ensuring compliance and prompt 
calls for the further development of the law. The section that follows explores another 
form of remote warfare which has similarly prompted calls for the development of 
international humanitarian law, to regulate a method of warfare not anticipated by the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Autonomous Weapon Systems 
While the use of drones and cyber operations present their own distinct challenges to 
the conceptual basis for the characterization of armed conflict, the use of autonomous 
weapon systems has been described as a potential ‘paradigm shift’.32 Autonomous 
Weapon Systems (AWS), also referred to as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems 
(LAWS), have been defined by the ICRC as ‘[a]ny weapon system with autonomy in 
its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for or detect, 
identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) 
targets without human intervention’.33 However, as noted by Michael W Meier, the 
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US government representative at third CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS in April 
2016, ‘views on what would constitute LAWS have varied greatly’.34 
In terms of legal regulation, much of the debate has centred on the degree of 
‘autonomy’ exercised in the use of lethal force.35 In the absence of meaningful human 
control, questions have been raised as to whether compliance with international 
humanitarian law would actually be possible with Autonomous Weapon Systems. 
This was reflected in the report of the 2016 Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) meeting of experts that took place at the United Nations in Geneva from 11 to 
15 April 2016. The report submitted by the chairperson, Ambassador Michael 
Biontino of Germany, states: 
44. It was of common understanding that, as with all weapon systems, 
the rules of IHL are fully applicable to LAWS. However, many 
delegations questioned whether weapons systems that select and attack 
targets autonomously would be able to comply with these rules. 
45. A number of delegations argued that human judgment was 
necessary in order to assess the fundamental principles of 
proportionality, distinction and precautions in attack. For this reason, it 
was recognized that a human operator should always be involved in the 
application of force. Many delegations questioned if it would be 
possible to programme a legal assessment into a machine prior to its 
deployment. Given the rapidly changing circumstances in a conflict, it 
would be difficult to conceive of a LAWS distinguishing between 
lawful and unlawful targets. For example, it was unclear as to how 
LAWS could be programmed to recognize the surrender of a 
combatant or take feasible precautions in attack. Additionally, it was 
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noted that a potential target may alter its behaviour in order to 
deliberately confuse assessments made by a machine.
36
 
The report of the CCW expert meeting states that: ‘Most delegations maintained that 
machines are simply incapable of executing legal judgements as required by IHL, 
especially in complex and cluttered environments typical in conflict scenarios.’37 In 
addition to the absence of meaningful human control in the selection and attack of 
targets, significant issues of accountability are raised by the use of Autonomous 
Weapons Systems. Given the technology’s state of development, it is currently not 
clear how the doctrine of command responsibility would apply to attacks undertaken 
using such weapons. This was also reflected in discussions at the CCW expert 
meeting: 
Accountability was highlighted as a central element of IHL. Doubts 
were raised over whether the required standards of accountability and 
responsibility for the use of force and its effects could be upheld with 
the deployment of LAWS. In the case of an incident involving LAWS, 
it was uncertain as to who would be held accountable within the chain 
of command or responsibility, such as the commander, programmer, or 
operator. As a result, it was argued by some that legal grey zones could 
emerge, which in turn might be deliberately exploited and foster 
impunity. Others noted that this would not be the case, but that 
evidentiary issues may arise. It was proposed that there should be a 
requirement for LAWS to keep records of their operations. Other 
delegations responded that, if LAWS can be used in compliance with 
IHL, there would not be an accountability gap as any issues could be 
addressed under international criminal law and the law of State 
responsibility.
38
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In light of the above, it was recommended that further consideration be given to the 
question of ‘legal and political responsibility and accountability’.39 
With regard to the applicability of international humanitarian law, concerns 
have been expressed that autonomous weapon systems may lower the threshold 
required for the qualification of a situation as one of armed conflict.
40
 In addition, the 
absence of human participation poses a challenge as to how the parties to armed 
conflicts are to be characterized. When two sides engage in hostilities through the use 
of autonomous weapons systems and there is no direct human participation in the 
conflict from either side, does the law of armed conflict apply? In other words, is it 
possible to qualify a situation as one of armed conflict if none of the parties directly 
engaged in hostilities are human beings? The answer to this question is arguably best 
addressed by considering rules relating to the interpretation of international 
humanitarian law under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. The section that follows will explore how such rules could be 
potentially applied to autonomous weapons systems and to the other forms of remote 
warfare discussed above. 
RESPONDING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Hersch Lauterpacht commented in the 1950s that ‘if international law is, in some 
ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more 
conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law’.41  If the law of armed 
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conflict has a vanishing point in the 21st century, it is arguably that of remote warfare. 
The challenges posed by drones, cyber operations and autonomous weapons systems 
to the applicability of international humanitarian law go well beyond the conditions of 
warfare contemplated by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. On account 
of this, it is essential to consider rules that govern the interpretation of such treaties. 
As mentioned above, the concepts of international and non-international armed 
conflict are linked to Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions. If 
international humanitarian law is to be deemed applicable to the different forms of 
remote warfare, it must be interpreted in terms consistent with the scope of these 
provisions. In this context, reference must be made to the terms of Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states the following general rule of 
interpretation: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose.
42
 
The status of this rule as customary international law has been confirmed in a number 
of cases before the International Court of Justice, including the La Grand case 
(Germany v the United States) in 2001,
43
 the Wall Advisory Opinion in 2004,
44
 and 
the case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in 2007.
45
 The significance of a treaty’s 
‘object and purpose’ is underscored by the fact that the term is used eight times in the 
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Vienna Convention.
46
 For applicability of international humanitarian law, the ‘object 
and purpose’ of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto is of 
pivotal importance to the interpretation of what ‘armed conflict’ consists of. This 
leads to the question as to how the object and purpose of these treaties should be 
characterized. The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties describes the 
approach adopted by the International Court of Justice: 
[T]he International Court of Justice has deduced the object and purpose 
of a treaty from a number of highly disparate elements, taken 
individually or in combination: 
− From its title; 
− From its preamble; 
− From an article placed at the beginning of the treaty that ‘must be 
regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the other treaty 
provisions are to be interpreted and applied’; 
− From an article of the treaty that demonstrates ‘the major concern of 
each contracting party’ when it concluded the treaty; 
− From the preparatory works on the treaty; and 
− From its overall framework.47 
Applying these elements to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols, the object and purpose of international humanitarian law may be 
characterized as the protection of victims of armed conflicts. While the titles of the 
Geneva Conventions specify different categories of protected persons, collectively 
they have been referred to as ‘International Conventions for the Protection of War 
Victims’.48 The title of Additional Protocol I refers to ‘the Protection of Victims of 
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International Armed Conflicts’, while the title of Additional Protocol II refers to ‘the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts’. 49  The preamble of 
Additional Protocol I states the belief of High Contracting Parties that it is necessary 
to ‘reaffirm and develop the provisions protecting the victims of armed conflicts and 
to supplement measures intended to reinforce their application’, while the preamble of 
Additional Protocol II emphasizes ‘the need to ensure a better protection for the 
victims of [non-international] armed conflicts’. The terms of these provisions are 
significant in that they set the context for the interpretation of operative provisions. 
The article ‘placed at the beginning’ of each of the four Geneva Conventions 
(Article 1) states: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.’ Taken together with the titles 
(both individual and collective), the provision reinforces the overall framework of 
each treaty for protection of victims of armed conflict. The travaux préparatoire is 
also consistent with this, reflected in the positions expressed by States involved in 
drafting process. For example, the Mexican Ambassador at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference stated: ‘This Conference was convened to examine the problem of 
protecting war victims. Each of our four working documents [that is the draft 
Conventions] has its own individual character; but they all have the same purpose – 
the protection of victims of war.’50 
Proceeding from the premise that the object and purpose of international 
humanitarian law is to further the protection of the victims of armed conflict, how 
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does this impact on the characterization of remote warfare? This question is arguably 
best addressed on a case-by-case basis by considering how the applicability of 
international humanitarian law is consistent with its object and purpose. For example, 
while the characterization of the campaign against ‘al-Qa’ida and its associated forces’ 
as a non-international armed conflict provides a context for the use of lethal force, it is 
not clear how it serves to realize the protection provided by the law. On the contrary, 
the potential exists for such a characterization—not limited by time or geography—to 
undermine rather than strengthen the protection provided, creating ‘global war 
without borders, in which no one is safe’.51 
If the concept of armed conflict is to be interpreted to accommodate new 
forms of warfare, this development must be consistent with the object and purpose of 
international humanitarian law. If not, then the integrity of the law and its utility in 
situations of armed conflict will be undermined. As noted in the conclusions of an 
Expert Panel convened in 2014 on the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones: 
The starting point of any legal analysis on armed drones should be 
existing international law, in particular the prohibition against the 
arbitrary deprivation of life. Modifying well-established rules of 
international law to accommodate the use of drones might have the 
unintended long-term consequence of weakening those rules. The 
existing legal framework was sufficient and did not need to be adapted 
to the use of drones, rather, it was the use of armed drones that must 
comply with international law.
52
 
With regard to cyber warfare, the issue of characterization is complicated by the lack 
of consensus on how it is to be defined, problems of attribution and the absence of an 
international agreement clarifying the applicability of international humanitarian law 
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to cyber operations. Although it is clear that international humanitarian law would 
apply once the threshold of armed conflict is reached, different views exist on the 
characterization of cyber operations. According to Noam Lubell: 
Cyber operations are a classic example of an attempt to fit things into 
the laws of armed conflict where in fact they should not be addressed 
through these laws at all. The default classification of cyber operations, 
on one view, is that they amount to an armed conflict and so the laws 
of armed conflict apply. However, it is also argued that since such 
operations do not adhere to the definition of attack under international 
humanitarian law, the restrictions on attacks, imposed by the principle 
of distinction, do not apply … One of the main challenges is to 
identify … which type of operation should be addressed under the laws 
of armed conflict and which type should not.
53
 
In deciding which operations should be addressed by international humanitarian law, 
the characterization of each situation should be guided by the object and purpose of 
this body of law: the protection of victims of armed conflict. Lowering the threshold 
for the use of lethal force would contravene this if it resulted in the applicable legal 
protections being rendered less effective, leaving those affected in a more vulnerable 
position. In the continuing development of international humanitarian law, it is likely, 
according to Michael Schmitt, that ‘new norms will emerge to address phenomena 
that have so fundamentally changed that the existing classification architecture … 
reveal classificatory lacuna’.54 He states that: ‘[s]ome aspects of conflict classification 
are likely to fall into desuetude … Other aspects will likely be reinterpreted to fit 
emerging contexts of armed conflict that were unanticipated.’55 If cyber operations are 
to be accommodated, this must be undertaken in a manner that preserves the integrity 
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of armed conflict as a concept of international humanitarian law, consistent with its 
object and purpose. 
Likewise with regard to autonomous weapon systems, this is an area where 
consensus on the basis for characterization is urgently required. According to William 
Boothby: 
Future developments in weapons technologies are likely to enable 
attacks to be prosecuted remotely, automatically, potentially 
autonomously and, in either case, perhaps also anonymously. Some 
such developments cause one to wonder whether notions of remote 
attack will take us to a point at which there is a degree of dissociation 
between armed forces personnel and the hostilities for which they are 
responsible. Taken to an extreme, perhaps hostilities in which 
machines target one another autonomously and/or automatically would 
cease to be ‘warfare’ as that term has traditionally been understood.56 
Accordingly, it is conceivable that autonomous weapon systems could be deployed in 
hostilities against other autonomous weapon systems. In the absence of human 
participation, could such a situation be characterized as one of armed conflict? As 
with other forms of remote warfare, assessments would need to be undertaken on a 
case-by-case basis. Even if autonomous weapon systems were to be deployed in a 
context where human casualties did not arise directly from the conduct of hostilities, it 
should be recognized that victims also result from displacement and the destruction of 
property, including the damage to works and installations containing dangerous forces, 
such as nuclear power stations. The question of qualification for application of 
international humanitarian law would necessarily need to take into account the 
function that law serves not only in relation to the protection of the human person but 
also with regard to the protection of cultural property and the natural environment. 
CONCLUSION 
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To respond to the challenges posed by remote warfare, it is necessary to be mindful of 
how the law has evolved and the importance of preserving the integrity of its 
interpretation. In order for this to be realized the concept of armed conflict must be 
interpreted in terms consistent with the object and purpose of international 
humanitarian law, that is, the protection of victims. As noted by Elizabeth Wilmshurst, 
‘[t]he protection of victims of war depends upon the proper application of 
international humanitarian law and that depends upon the appropriate classification’.57 
Indeed: 
Legal complexities about the distinctions between categories of 
hostilities should not be allowed to get in the way of the objectives of 
international humanitarian law, either by making the application of the 
legal protections more difficult or by rendering the law so complex that 
none but the most sophisticated of armed forces can realistically apply 
it.
58
 
In order to further the protection provided by the law, newer forms of warfare—
including the use of armed drones, autonomous weapons system and cyber 
operations—must be accommodated in the concept of armed conflict. The basis for 
doing so should be consistent with the existing framework that governs the conduct of 
hostilities, irrespective of how hostilities are characterized. As noted by the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, the laws that govern armed conflict ‘are 
not static, but by continual adaptation follow the needs of a changing world’.59 
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